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Abstract. Block cipher E2, designed and submitted by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corpo-
ration, is a first-round Advanced Encryption Standard candidate. It employs a Feistel structure as
global structure and two-layer substitution-permutation network structure in round function with
initial transformation IT function before the first round and final transformation FT function after
the last round. The design principles influences several more recent block ciphers including Camellia,
an ISO/IEC standard cipher.
In this paper, we focus on the key-recovery attacks on reduced-round E2-128/192 taking both
IT and FT functions in consideration with integral cryptanalysis. We first improve the relations
between zero-correlation linear approximations and integral distinguishers, and then deduce some
integral distinguishers from zero-correlation linear approximations over 6 rounds of E2. Furthermore,
we apply these integral distinguishers to break 6-round E2-128 with 2120 chosen plaintexts (CPs),
2115.4 encryptions and 228 bytes memory. In addition, the attack on 7-round E2-192 requires 2120
CPs, 2172.5 encryptions and 260 bytes memory.
Keywords: E2 block cipher, Integral attack, Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, Cryptography.
1 Introduction
Integral attack, extended from square attack [1], is one of the most popular cryptanalytic
tools for block ciphers. At FSE 2002, Knudsen and Wagner [2] introduced the definition of
integral attack and unified a kind of Square attack such as saturation attack [3] and multiset
attack [4] as integral attack. The basic idea of integral attack is to analyze some properties
of sums of values, such as zero-sum property in specific parts of ciphertexts. Thus, it can be
seen as a dual to differential cryptanalysis [5]. However, integral attack has not been thought
suitable for bit-based block ciphers until Zaba et al. [6] proposed the bit-based integral attack
in 2008, which was applied to Noekeon, Serpent and PRESENT reduced up to 5, 6 and 7
rounds. Integral attack has been applied to many block ciphers so far, such as Rijndael [7],
ARIA [8] and MISTY1[9] and it is also one of the best attacks on AES [10]. It reveals that
integral attacks may be an important tool to understand the security of block ciphers.
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2Linear cryptanalysis [11] is another prominent cryptanalysis method against block ciphers.
Several extensions of linear cryptanalysis have been introduced so far, such as multiple linear
approximations cryptanalysis [12] and multidimensional linear cryptanalysis [13]. In 2012,
Bogdanov et al. [14] developed a new method for cryptanalysis of block ciphers named
zero-correlation linear attack. Zero-correlation linear attack uses linear approximations with
zero-correlation for all keys. It can be seen as the counterpart of impossible differential
cryptanalysis[15].
A number of relations have been established among some previously known statistical
attacks on block ciphers so far. Chabaud and Vaudenay [16] presented the mathematical links
between differential probability and linear correlation. Relations between multidimensional
linear and truncated differential distinguishers were established by Blondeau and Nyberg [17],
and they showed that the existence of zero-correlation relations is equivalent to the existence
of an impossible differential property. Integral attacks also have some relations with other
statistical attacks. Integral and zero-correlation distinguishers were established by Bogdanov
et al. [18] and they presented that an integral implies a zero-correlation distinguisher and a
zero-correlation distinguisher implies an integral if input and output masks are independent
of each other.
E2 [19] is a 128-bit block cipher with a user key length of 128, 192 or 256 bits. For
simplicity, we denote by E2-128/192/256 the three versions of E2 that use 128, 192, and
256 key bits, respectively. It was designed and submitted to Advanced Encryption Standard
project by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation. The design criteria of E2 are
conservative, adopting a Feistel network structure as a global structure and the two-layer
Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) structure in its round function. All operations
used in the data randomization phase are byte table lookups and byte xors except 32-bit
multiplications in initial transformation IT and final transformation FT , which successfully
makes E2 a fast software cipher independent of target platforms.
The cryptanalytic results for round-reduced E2 have been concentrating around truncated,
impossible differentials and zero-correlation linear attack. 7-round truncated differential char-
acteristic of E2 was proposed by Matsui and Tokita in [20], and then they proposed a possible
attack on an 8-round E2 without IT and FT functions under data complexity 2100 chosen
plaintexts and unknown time complexity. Moriai et al.[21] found another 7-round truncated
differential characteristic with higher probability and they presented a possible key recovery
attack on 8-round E2-128 without IT and FT under data complexity 294 chosen plaintexts
and uncertain time complexity.
For the security against impossible differential cryptanalysis, Aoki et al.[22] studied the
impossible differentials of E2 for the first time. However, they found no impossible differential
more than 5 rounds for E2 without IT and FT functions. The authors[23] declared some
6-round impossible differential characteristics of E2 without IT and FT functions, but still
no attack results on E2 was given. Wei et al.[24] presented key recovery attack on 7-round
3Attack Type key size Rounds IT/FT Date Time Source
Impossible Differential 128 7 None 2120CPs 2115.5Enc [24]
multidimensional zero-correlation 128 8 None 2124.1CPs 2119.1 Enc [25]
Truncated Differential 128 8 One 294CPs − [21]
Multidimensional zero-correlation 128 6 Both 2123.7KPs 2119.1 Enc [25]
Integral 128 6 Both 2120CPs 2115.4 Enc Sect.4
Integral 192 7 Both 2120CPs 2172.5 Enc Sect.4
Impossible Differential 256 8 None 2121CPs 2214Enc [24]
Multidimensional Zero-Correlation 256 9 None 2124.6 KPs 2255.5Enc [25]
Multidimensional Zero-Correlation 256 7 Both 2124.7 KPs 2252.8Enc [25]
Integral 256 7 Both 2120CPs 2172.5 Enc Sect.4
Table 1: Summary of the attacks on E2
E2-128 without IT and FT requiring 2120 chosen plaintexts and 2115.5 encryptions, and the
key recovery attack on 8-round E2-256 without IT and FT requires 2214 encryptions with 2121
chosen plaintexts. Recently, Wen et al [25]. identified zero-correlation linear approximations
over 6 rounds of E2, and then they introduced the multidimensional zero-correlation linear
attacks on 8-round E2-128 and 9-round E2-256 without IT and FT . In addition, they
proposed key recovery attacks on 6-round E2-128 and 7-round E2-256 with both IT and FT
taken into consideration for the first time. Attack results on E2 are summarized in Table 1.
In this paper, the 6-round integral distinguishers are discussed in detail. Furthermore, we
investigate the security of reduced-round E2-128/192 with both IT and FT functions against
integral cryptanalysis. Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
1. We deduce some 6-round integral distinguishers from new-revealed 6-round zero-
correlation linear approximations of E2 by improving the relations between zero-correlation
linear approximations and integral distinguishers. The integral distinguishers have much
stronger ability to distinguish the right from wrong keys.
2. Integrals attacks on 6-round E2-128 and 7-round E2-192 with both IT and FT taken in
consideration are proposed. To my knowledge, they are the first integral attacks on reduced-
round of E2 with both IT and FT .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of block cipher E2 and
outlines the ideas of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis and integral cryptanalysis. In addi-
tion, the relations between zero-correlation linear approximations and integral distinguishers
are also discussed. Some new zero-correlation linear approximations and the deduced integral
distinguishers are shown in Section 3. Section 4 illustrate our attacks on 6-round E2-128 and
the 7-round E2-192 with both IT and FT functions taken in consideration. We conclude in
Section 5.
4Figure 1: The structure and building blocks of E2
2 Preliminarise
2.1 Description of E2
E2 is a 128-bit block cipher proposed by NTT in 1998 and is selected as one of the fifteen
candidates in the first round of AES project. E2 is a Feistel cipher with two-layer SPN
structure in its round function and iterates 12 times with an IT function at the beginning
and an FT function at the end. Figure 1 (a) shows the outline of the E2 encryption process,
also see Algorithm 1. The decryption process of E2 is the same as the encryption process
except for the order of the subkeys.
The round function employs SPS structures including the XOR operation with the first
round subkey, the first nonlinear transformation consisting of eight parallel 8 × 8 S-boxes,
the linear transformation P , the XOR operation with the second round subkey, the second
nonlinear transformation consisting of eight parallel 8×8 S-boxes and the second linear layer
BRL in order. Figure 1(b) outlines the round function that consists of S-function, P -function,
and BRL-function. We refer [19] for more details of the specification and notations.
The first linear transformation P : F 642 → F 642 in round function can be expressed with
matrix-vector product,
5Algorithm 1 The E2 block cipher
Require: 128-bit plaintext P = (PL, PR); main key K,
Ensure: 128-bit ciphertext C = (CL, CR).
1: Derive round keys Ki, (1 ≤ i ≤ 16) from K.
2: (L0, R0) = IT (P,K13,K14).
3: for j = 1 to 12 do
4: Rj = F (Rj−1,Kj)⊕ Lj−1, Lj = Rj−1,
5: end for
6: (CL, CR) = FT ((R12, L12),K15,K16).
7: return C = (CL, CR).

z′1
z′2
z′3
z′4
z′5
z′6
z′7
z′8

=

0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1

·

z1
z2
z3
z4
z5
z6
z7
z8

where zi, z
′
i ∈ F 82 and 1 ≤ i ≤ 8.
The second linear layer BRL is much easier and can be represented as follows:
BRL : F 828 → F 828 : (y1, y2, ..., y8)→ (y2, y3, ..., y8, y1).
Both IT and FT functions are key-dependent transformations, which are designed to
increase security against both known attacks and unknown attacks. IT and FT are described
as follows.
IT : F 1282 × F 1282 × F 1282 → F 1282 ; (X,A,B) = BP ((X ⊕A)⊗B);
FT : F 1282 × F 1282 × F 1282 → F 1282 ; (X,A,B) = (BP−1(X)B)⊕A,
where the byte permutation BP and BP−1 are shown in Figure 1(c). As to operation ⊗
and , if we represent X = (x1, x2, x3, x4), Y = (y1, y2, y3, y4), and B = (b1, b2, b3, b4), where
xi, yi, bi ∈ F 322 ; 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, and use ∨1 to denote bitwise logical OR with 1 ∈ F 322 , then we
have:
Y = X ⊗B := yi = xi(bi ∨ 1)mod 232 (i = 1, 2, 3, 4);
Y = X B := xi = yi(bi ∨ 1)−1mod 232 (i = 1, 2, 3, 4).
In addition, our attacks do not utilize the key relation, we omit the details of E2’s key
schedule.
62.2 Basic ideas of integral and zero-correlation linear attack
In this section, we briefly recall the basic concepts of integral cryptanalysis. Let E = E1 ·E0
be the encryption function of an r round block cipher, where E0 is the first r1 rounds of E
and E1 is the last r − r1 rounds. It can be written formally as
C = E(P,K) = E1(E0(P,K0),K1),
or equivalently,
E−11 (C,K1) = E0(P,K0),
where E−11 is the inverse function of E1, K is the master key, K0 and K1 are subkeys in the
first r1 rounds and the last r − r1 rounds, respectively.
In integral attacks, an attacker first selects a set of 2d plaintexts, where d bit positions
of P take on all values through the set and the other bits of P are chosen to be arbitrary
constants. Then, some properties, such as a zero-sum property, of the set of plaintexts
propagating through r1 round encryptions is proved. For example, an attacker demonstrates
that ∑
p∈Ω
E0(p,K0)mod 2 = 0,
where Ω is the set of 2d plaintexts. Finally, the subkey K1 in the last r− r1 rounds is guessed
and equation ∑
p∈Ω,c=E(p,K)
E−11 (c,K1)mod 2 = 0
is used to verify the guess. The remaining key bits in the master key K will be obtained by
exhausting method.
Notice that, the integral distinguisher is built upon a specific parts of the output of E0,
and the property of the output of E0 determine the ability of the distinguisher to sieve keys.
In this paper, we develop a stronger integral distinguisher from some zero-correlation linear
approximates. We recall some basic concepts of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis.
Let a and β be the input and output masks. We denote a→ β the correlation of a linear
approximation of a vectorial function f(x) by
Corx(β · f(x), a · x) = 2Prx(β · f(x)⊕ a · x = 0)− 1,
where the scalar product of binary vectors is denoted by a ·x = ⊕ni=1aixi. In zero-correlation
linear cryptanalysis, the distinguisher uses linear approximations with zero correlation for all
keys, while the classical linear cryptanalysis utilizes linear approximations with correlation
as far from zero as possible. Let us recall a result of correlations of restrictions of Boolean
functions.
7Theorem 2.1. Let f : Fn12 × Fn22 → Fn2 be a vectorial Boolean function, and let xn1 ∈ Fn12
be uniformly distributed. Then∑
xn1∈F
n1
2
cor2xn2
(a · xn2 ⊕ b · f(xn1 , xn2)) = 2n2
∑
c∈Fn12
cor2xn1 ,xn2
(c · xn1 ⊕ a · xn2 ⊕ b · f(xn1 , xn2)),
for all a ∈ Fn22 , b ∈ Fn2 \ {0}, where n1, n2, n are positive integrals.
This fact was named as Fundamental Theorem in [26], which describes the links between
integral distinguishers and the zero-correlation linear approximates. In order to apply Theo-
rem 2.1 to the analysis of E2 block cipher, we should make some improvements. The following
theorem can be proved by repeating the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [26].
Theorem 2.2. Let f : Fm12 × Fm22 × Fm32 → Fm2 be a vectorial Boolean function, and let
xm2 ∈ Fm22 be uniformly distributed. Then∑
xm2∈F
m2
2
cor2xm1 ,xm3
(a · xm1 ⊕ c · xm3 ⊕ b · f(xm1 , xm2 , xm3))
= 2m1+m3
∑
d∈Fm22
cor2xm1 ,xm2 ,xm3
(a · xm1 ⊕ c · xm3 ⊕ d · xm2 ⊕ b · f(xm1 , xm2 , xm3)),
for all a ∈ Fm12 , c ∈ Fm32 and b ∈ Fm2 \ {0}, where m1,m2,m3,m are positive integrals.
Corollary 2.1. Let f : Fm12 × Fm22 × Fm32 → Fm2 . Then the following are equivalent
(i) corxm1 ,xm3
(
(0, ..., 0, bq, 0, ..., 0) · f(xm1 , xm2 , xm3)
)
= 0, for all bq ∈ F q2 \ {0};
(ii) corxm1 ,xm2 ,xm3
(
(0, ..., 0, dm2 , 0, ..., 0) · x⊕ (0, ..., 0, bq, 0, ..., 0) · f(xm1 , xm2 , xm3)
)
= 0,
for all dm2 ∈ Fm22 and bq ∈ F q2 \ {0}.
Let a = 0 ∈ Fm12 , c = 0 ∈ Fm32 and b = (0, ..., 0, bq, 0, ..., 0), the equivalence of (i) and (ii)
follows from Theorem 2.2.
3 Some integral distinguishers on 6-round of E2
In this section, we show a series of integral distinguishers of 6-round E2. Firstly, we derive
several types of zero-correlation linear approximations for 6-round E2 following the properties
on the propagation of linear masks over basic block cipher operations proposed in [14].
We assert that the 6-round linear approximations
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, b)→ (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, h, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
have zero-correlation, where b and h denote any non-zero value.
8Figure 2: Zero-correlation linear approximations of 6-round E2
Consider that the input masks(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, b) will result that the in-
put mask for L3 is (f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f6, f7, f8⊕ b) in the forward direction, where fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 8
denotes a non-zero value. Similarly, in the backward direction, we can get that the output
mask of L3 is (0, g1, g2, g3, 0, 0, g4, g5) from the output (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, h, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
where gi,1 ≤ i ≤ 5 also denotes a non-zero value. Then, we have f1 = 0 and f5 = 0 and
therefore e1 = 0 and e5 = 0. According to the relations between ei and di, the following
equations should hold, e1 = d3 ⊕ d4 ⊕ d5 ⊕ d6 ⊕ d8 = 0, e5 = d3 ⊕ d4 ⊕ d5 ⊕ d8 = 0. It is
easy to deduce that d6 = 0, which contradicts that d6 6= 0. As a result, the linear hull is a
zero-correlation linear hull, see Figure 2.
By Corollary 2.1, we can deduce some 6 round integral distinguishers from the zero-
correlation linear approximations of E2, which are described in the following property.
Property 3.1. Choose a set of 2120 input of the r round , where the values of byte Rr[8] are
chosen and other bits are chosen to be arbitrary constants. Encrypt the chosen 2120 values 6
rounds, then, each of the 28 possible values of Lr+6[6] occurs exactly 2
112 times.
The integral distinguishers in the above property have much stronger ability to distinguish
the right and wrong keys. Let F : F 1202 → F 82 be a random vectorial Boolean function and
the sets Aj = {xj ∈ F 1202 |F (xj) = yj}, where yj ∈ F 82 , 1 ≤ j ≤ 28, then the probability of
the random vectorial Boolean function satisfying |Aj | = 2112, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ 28 is about
2−14531, which is extremely small.
94 Key-recovery attacks on 6/7-round E2-128/192 with IT and FT
In this section, we present integral attacks on 6-round E2-128 and 7-round E2-192 with IT
and FT using the integral distinguisher in Property 3.1. We first show a property about the
modular multiplication over F 322 , which is adopted both in IT and FT .
Property 4.1. Denote 32-bit input, output and subkey of the modular multiplication over
F 322 in IT function as (x4, x3, x2, x1), (y4, y3, y2, y1) and (k4, k3, k2, k1) respectively, where x1,
y1 and k1 are the least significant bytes. Then the output byte yi is only related to x1, .., xi
and k1, .., ki. Moreover, If x1 is fixed as a constant, and (x4, x3, x2) traversal F
24
2 , then y1 is
a corresponding constant, and y4, y3, y2 traversal F
24
2 .
Property 4.1 can be proved easily according to the property of modular multiplication
operation in F 322 , which means that when we want to compute yi, we only need to guess
k1, ..., ki other than guess all 32-bit subkey values. Meanwhile, there is no need to obtain
all 32-bit input value either, the knowledge of the value x1, ..., yi is sufficient to compute yi.
see [25]. In addition, to construct special structures of the output of IF function that some
bits are arbitrary constants, while the other bits take all possible values, we only need to
construct special structures of the input of IF function satisfy corresponding properties.
4.1 Key-recovery attacks on 6-round E2-128 with IT and FT
To attack 6-round E2-128 with IT and FT , the 6-round integral distinguishers from Figure 2
start from round 1 and end at round 6. The IT function is added before and FT function is
appended after the integral distinguishers, refer to Figure 3(a). The partial encryption and
decryption using the partial sum technique are proceeded as follows.
1. Choose a set of 2120 plaintexts to construct a structure, where PR[4] are chosen to be
arbitrary constants over F 82 , while the other 120 bits take all possible values of F
120
2 . Allocate
128-bit counters V1[x1] for 2
24 possible values of x1 = CL[2, 3, 4] and initialize them to zero.
For the corresponding ciphertexts after 6 round encryption with IT and FT , extract the
value of x1 and increment the corresponding counter V1[x1]. The time complexity of this step
is 2120 memory accesses to process the chosen PC pairs. We assume that processing each
PC pair is equivalent to 1/4 round encryption, then the time complexity of this step is about
2120 × 1/4× 1/6 ≈ 2115.4 6-round encryptions.
2. Allocate 128-bit counters V2[x2] for 2
8 possible values of x2 = L6[2] and initialize them
to zero. Guess K10[2, 3, 4] and K9[2, 3, 4] and partially encrypt x1 to get the value of x2, then
update the corresponding counter by V2[x2]+ = V1[x1]. The computation in this step is much
simpler than 1/2 round encryption and is proceeded about 224 × 224 × 224 × 1/2 = 271.
3. After Step 2, 48 key bits have been guessed. If there exists x2 ∈ F 82 , V2[x2] 6= 2112,
discard the guessed keys and guess another subkey until we get the correct subkey
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Figure 3: Key-recovery attacks on 6 and 7-round E2-128/192 with IT and FT
In this attack,there are 48-bit key value guessed during the encryption phase, and only
the right key candidates survive in the wrong key filtration. The dominant complexity of
Step 1 is no more than 2115.4 6-round encryptions. In total, the data complexity is about 2120
chosen plaintexts, the time complexity is about 2115.4 6-round encryptions and the memory
requirement are 228 bytes for counters.
4.2 Key-recovery attack on 7-round E2-192 with IT and FT
Let the 6-round integral distinguishers cover from round 1 to round 6, and add IT function
before and append one round and FT function after. The details of the attack 7-round
E2-192 with IT and FT are illustrated as follows, also see Figure 3(b).
1. Choose a set of 2120 plaintexts to construct a structure, where PR[4] are chosen to
be arbitrary constants over F 42 , while the other 120 bits take all possible values of F
120
2 .
Allocate 128-bit counters V1[x1] for 2
56 possible values of x1 = CL[2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8]‖CL[8] and
initialize them to zero. For the corresponding ciphertexts after 7 round encryption with IT
and FT , extract the value of x1 and increment the corresponding counter V1[x1]. The time
complexity of this step is 2120 memory accesses to process each chosen PC pairs. We assume
that processing each PC pair is equivalent to 1/4 round encryption, then the time complexity
of this step is about 2120 × 1/4× 1/7 ≈ 2115.3 encryptions.
11
Step Guess Keys Complexity Computed States
4 K
(1)
7 [3] 2
128 × 248 x4 = R7[6]‖L7[4, 7, 8]‖X[2]⊕X[3]
5 K
(1)
7 [4] 2
136 × 240 x5 = R7[6]‖L7[7, 8]‖X[2]⊕X[3]⊕X[4]
6 K
(1)
7 [7] 2
144 × 232 x6 = R7[6]‖L7[8]‖X[2]⊕X[3]⊕X[4]⊕X[7]
7 K
(1)
7 [8] 2
152 × 224 x7 = R7[6]‖‖X[2]⊕X[3]⊕X[4]⊕X[7]⊕X[8]
8 K
(2)
7 [7] 2
160 × 216 x8 = R6[6]
Table 2: Partial Encryption and Decryption of the Attack on 7-Round E2-192
2. Allocate 128-bit counters V2[x2] for 2
48 possible values of x2 = R7[6]‖L7[2, 3, 4, 7, 8]
and initialize them to zero. GuessK10[2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 16] andK11[2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 16] and partially
encrypt x1 to get the value of x2, then update the corresponding counter by V2[x2]+ = V1[x1].
The computation in this step is no more than 1/2 round encryption and is proceeded about
256 × 256 × 256 × 1/2× 1/7 = 2164.2.
3. Allocate 128-bit counters V3[x3] for 2
48 possible values of x3 = R7[6]‖L7[3, 4, 7, 8]‖X[2]
and initialize them to zero. Guess K17 [2] and partially encrypt x2 to get the value of x3, then
update the corresponding counter by V3[x3]+ = V2[x2]. The computation in this step is no
more than 1/8 round encryption and the time complexity is about 256×256×28×248×1/8×
1/7 = 2162.2.
The following steps in the partial encryption and decryption phase are similar to Step 3.
Thus, to be consistent, we use Table 2 to show the details of each partial encryption and
decryption step.
9. After Step 8, 168 key bits have been guessed. If there exists any x9 ∈ F 82 , V9[x9] 6= 2112,
then, discard the guessed keys and guess another subkey until we get the correct subkey
In this attack, there are 168-bit key value guessed during the encryption phase, and only
the right key candidates can survive in the wrong key filtration. The dominant complexities
of Step 3 to 8 are no more than 2172.5 7-round encryptions totally. Then, the data complexity
is about 2120 chosen plaintexts, the time complexity is about 2172.5 7-round encryptions and
the memory requirement are 260 bytes for counters.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate the security of E2 block cipher with respect to the technique of
integral cryptanalysis. We deduce some 6-round integral distinguishers from new-revealed
6-round zero-correlation linear approximations of E2 by improving the relation between zero
correlation linear approximations and integral distinguishers. Besides we give the first integral
attack on the 6 round E2-128 and the 7 round E2-192 with IT and FT functions taken into
consideration. The two attacks need 2115.4 encryptions with 2120 chosen plaintexts and 2172.5
encryptions with 2120 chosen plaintexts, respectively.
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